






surveillance	 for	 the	 virus.	 Environmental	 samples	 from	
poultry	markets	in	21	city	CDCs	(n	=	8,942)	and	respiratory	
samples	 from	persons	with	 influenza-like	 illness	 or	 pneu-
monia	 (n	 =	 32,342)	 were	 tested;	 viruses	 isolated	 from	 6	
environmental	 samples	and	16	patients	were	 sequenced.	
Sequence	 analysis	 showed	 co-circulation	 of	 4	 influenza	




detected	 by	 environmental	 surveillance.	 Co-circulation	 of	
multiple	 avian	 influenza	 viruses	 that	 can	 infect	 humans	
highlights	the	need	for	increased	surveillance	of	poultry	and	
potential	environmental	sources.
Human infection with a novel avian-origin influenza A(H7N9) virus was first identified in eastern China in 
February 2013, and a major outbreak occurred from the end 
of March through the beginning of May (1,2). Risk factors 
identified for a severe course of illness were older age (>65 
years) and underlying illnesses, including hypertension and 
chronic lung diseases, but the full spectrum of illness associ-
ated with H7N9 virus remains to be determined (3). Molecu-
lar characterization has shown that the H7N9 virus emerged 
by reassortment between H7, N9, and H9N2 avian influenza 
viruses from the Yangzi River Delta region; this reassort-
ment likely occurred in eastern China in early 2012 (2,4,5). 
Because infection with H7N9 virus does not cause overt dis-
ease in poultry, the spread of infection can be insidious, and 
the exact modes and extent of geographic spread of the virus 
remain unknown. Birds commonly used for egg and meat 
production in China differ in their susceptibility, levels of 
virus shedding, and ability to transmit the virus; data from 
experimental infections indicate that quail and chickens are 
possible candidates for virus transmission (6). Detailed anal-
ysis of viruses from human patients showed evidence for di-
versification through reassortment of the originally detected 
viruses with strains from poultry in the same geographic re-
gion (7). Infection of humans is linked to exposure to poultry 
or to environments where poultry are present; closure of live 
poultry markets (LPMs) has had a measurable effect on con-
trolling the spread of infection (8,9).
After H7N9 virus was initially detected in eastern 
China, the Guangdong Provincial Center for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention (CDC) implemented environmental 
surveillance and syndromic surveillance in humans. After 
H7N9 virus infection in humans was reported, enhanced 
sentinel hospital surveillance and environmental sampling 
programs were implemented to identify possible cases and 
analyze the evolution of the virus. The first case of human 
infection with H7N9 virus in Guangdong was confirmed 
in a patient with severe pneumonia on August 10, 2013. 
This case-patient was a 51-year-old female poultry worker 
at a local LPM in Huizhou city in Guangdong Province. No 
other cases were reported until October 2013, when a wave 
of cases began in several provinces, including Guangdong. 
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We present results of ongoing environmental and human 
syndromic surveillance for H7N9 virus circulation in 
Guangdong Province, as well as virologic analyses related 
to the natural history of this outbreak. 
Materials and Methods
Syndromic Surveillance in Humans
Since April 16, 2013, enhanced surveillance for in-
fluenza A(H7N9) virus has been conducted in 28 sentinel 
hospitals and 23 collaborating laboratories in 21 cities in 
Guangdong Province, China. All specimens are first tested 
for avian influenza A virus; specimens with positive results 
are then further tested in the laboratories of the 21 city 
CDCs for subtypes H5, H7, and H9 by using commercial 
real-time reverse transcription PCR (RT-PCR) (Liferiver, 
Shanghai ZJ Bio-Tech, Shanghai, China). Results are fur-
ther verified at the Guangdong Provincial CDC. H7-posi-
tive specimens are tested for N9 gene segments by using 
real-time RT-PCR (2). H7N9-positive swab materials and 
sputum samples are then blindly passaged for 2 or 3 gen-
erations in 9- or 10-day-old embryonated chicken eggs for 
virus isolation. Hemagglutination-positive allantoic fluids 
are collected, and viruses are subtyped by hemagglutina-
tion and neuraminidase inhibition (HI and NI) assays by us-
ing a panel of reference antiserum, as described by Huang 
et al. (10). Standard precautions are taken to avoid cross-
contamination of specimens. All H7 influenza viruses iso-
lated from patients undergo complete genome sequencing.
Environmental Surveillance
In April 2013, the Guangdong Provincial CDC 
launched an environmental surveillance program to moni-
tor for avian influenza viruses in LPMs. Environmental 
samples were collected from LPMs in Guangdong Prov-
ince during April 15, 2013–February 28, 2014. Each week 
during April 15–May 31, 2013, twenty environmental 
samples per market were collected from selected markets 
in 21 cities at the prefecture level. The environmental 
sampling was done by collecting wet-swab specimens 
from poultry feces, chicken epilator surfaces, chopping 
board surfaces, cage surfaces, and sewage. If a human 
H7N9 case was confirmed and the case-patient had ex-
posure in an LPM, >20 environmental samples would be 
collected from that market.
Samples were collected from poultry feces by swab-
bing the surfaces of the chicken epilator, chopping boards, 
and cages 4–8 times with separate cotton-tipped swabs 
(Copan Italia, Brescia, Italy). The swabs were then inserted 
into a tube containing 3 mL of virus transport medium (Co-
pan Italia) and stored at 4°C before shipping to the CDC 
laboratory. At arrival in the laboratory, samples were vor-
texed and swabs were discarded. Total RNA and DNA 
were extracted simultaneously from 200 mL supernatant of 
the sample by using the QIAamp minElute Virus Spin Kit 
(QIAGEN, Crawley, UK), according to the manufacturer’s 
instructions. Then, 5 mL of eluate was tested for influenza 
A; thereafter, testing for subtypes H5, H7, and H9 was 
done by commercial real-time reverse transcription PCR 
(RT-PCR) (Liferiver, Shanghai ZJ Bio-Tech). H7-positive 
specimens were further subjected to N9 gene-specific RT-
PCR. Dual positive samples were blindly passaged for 
2–3 generations in 9- to 10-day-old embryonated chicken 
eggs for virus isolation. Hemagglutinin (HA)–positive 
isolates were collected and further subtyped by HI and NI 
assays using a panel of reference antiserum, as described 
by Huang et al. (10). Standard precautions were taken to 
avoid cross-contamination of specimens. Monoinfluenza 
virus infection (without mixed infection of other subtypes) 
was further confirmed by RT-PCR before whole-genome 
sequencing. All H7N9 isolates from LPMs were subjected 
to complete genome sequencing, as were 7 H9 influenza vi-
ruses that were isolated from different LPMs during May–
December 2013.
Whole-Genome Deep Sequencing
For all selected isolates, all 8 gene segments (HA, 
neuraminidase [NA], nucleoprotein [NP], polymerase ba-
sic 1 [PB1] and 2 [PB2], polymerase acidic [PA], matrix 
[M], and nonstructural [NS]) were sequenced by using a 
next-generation sequencing strategy for influenza A virus 
sequencing with the Ion PGM System and PathAmp FluA 
Reagents (Life Technologies, Carlsbad, CA, USA). Viral 
RNA extraction was performed by using the QIAamp Vi-
ral RNA Mini Kit (QIAGEN, Hilden, Germany). Reverse 
transcription PCR amplification of all 8 gene segments 
were performed by using PathAmp Flu A Preamplification 
Reagents (Life Technologies). Amplicons were purified 
and quantitated by using the Ampure XP purification kit 
(Beckman, Brea, CA, USA). The genomic libraries were 
prepared with the Ion Xpress Plus Fragment Library Kit 
(Life Technologies). Enzymatic fragmentation was used 
for the 200-bp read protocol with a 10-min incubation time. 
Samples were assigned barcodes by using the Ion Xpress 
Barcode Adapters 1–32 Kit (Life Technologies). Auto-
mated template preparation was performed by using the 
Ion OneTouch 2 System (Ion PGM Template OT2 200 Kit; 
Life Technologies). Final sequencing was performed with 
the Ion PGM Sequencing 200 Kit v2 (Life Technologies) 
using the Ion 316 Chip V2.
Genome Sequence Alignment
Genome sequence assembly was done with the patho-
gen analysis program of the Ion PGM server (Life Tech-
nologies). Multiple sequence alignment against previously 





viruses was performed by using ClustalW (http://www.
clustal.org) and BioEdit software version 7.14 (http://www.
mbio.ncsu.edu/bioedit/bioedit.html). The whole-genome 
sequences were submitted to GISAID (http://www.gisaid.
org; accession nos. EPI148417 and EPI151429–151437).
Phylogenetic Analysis and Data Visualization
Maximum-likelihood trees were estimated for all 8 
gene segments by using MEGA version 5.2 (http://www.
megasoftware.net) with the general time reversible + G 
model (11). To assess the robustness of individual nodes on 
phylogenetic trees, a bootstrap resampling process (1,000 
replications) and the neighbor-joining method were used.
The initial trees were constructed in PhyML by using 
general time reversible + I + Γ4 as the evolutionary model 
(12). GARLI (https://code.google.com/p/garli/) was run on 
the best tree from PhyML for 1 million generations to opti-
mize tree topology and branch lengths.
Results
Syndromic Surveillance
A total of 34,342 samples from patients with pneumo-
nia or influenza-like illness from 21 cities in Guangdong 
Province were tested during April 2013–February 2014. Of 
these, samples from 81 patients from 10 cities tested posi-
tive for influenza A(H7N9) virus. With the exception of 1 
case confirmed in August 2013, all other cases were found 
starting in October 2013. In total, 6 cases were confirmed 
in 2013 and 75 in early 2014. 
Patient characteristics are summarized in Table 1. Most 
patients were male, and the median age of all patients was 52 
years. Of the 81 patients, 70 (84%) had severe illness, which 
likely reflected the design of the surveillance (hospitalized 
patients). Twenty-two (27%) patients died; 14 remained hos-
pitalized as of May 2014, and 45 had recovered. Overall, 73 
patients (90.1%) reported poultry contact (Table 1).
Environmental Surveillance
A total of 8,942 swab samples from LPMs were col-
lected and screened in laboratories of city CDCs at the pre-
fecture level and at Guangdong Provincial CDC (2). Over-
all, 425 samples (4.8%) from 13 cities tested positive for H7 
viruses, and 1,050 (11.8%) from 19 cities were positive for 
H9 viruses. The prevalence of viral genes in regions with 
positive findings ranged from 1%–14% of swab samples 
for H7 viruses and 1.7%–27.5% for H9. The H9 detection 
rate remained ≈12% throughout the year, except during 
June, when only 4% of samples tested positive. H9 viruses 
were detected throughout Guangdong Province (19 of the 
21 cities; Figure 1, panel A). In contrast, only 1 H7-virus 
positive specimen was detected during March–September 
2013 (in Meizhou in April), but detections of H7 viruses 
increased beginning in October: from 1 site in October, 3 
in November, 8 in January, and 7 in February. H7 viruses 
were detected in the Pearl River Regions of Guangdong 
Province (Figure 1, panel B). Human cases were found in 
10 of the 13 cities where environmental samples were posi-
tive for H7, and in 0 of the 8 cities where no H7 viruses 
were found in environmental samples (Figure 1).
Sequence Analysis
Internal Genes
Whole-genome sequences were determined for the 
H7N9 virus isolates from 16 patients and 6 environmental 
samples and for the 9 H9 viruses collected during environ-
mental surveillance. Phylogenetic trees were constructed 
for each internal gene segment against all currently avail-
able H7N9 and H9N2 virus sequences from the National 
Center for Biotechnology Information and GISAID. Phy-
logenetic analysis of the whole-genome sequences showed 
the clear separation of PB2, PB1, and NS gene sequences 
of the Guangdong patient isolates from those detected from 
patients from eastern China (Figure 2).
Gene sequences on the same branch were reviewed to 
identify region of origin; these sequences matched inter-







 M 48	(59.3) 
 F 33	(40.7) 
Age group, y†  
 ≤20 12	(14.8) 
 21–40 13	(16.0) 
 41–60 25	(30.9) 
 ≥61 31	(38.3) 
Exposure	history  
 Live	poultry market	visit 47	(58.0) 
 Household	poultry	breeding 10	(12.3) 
 Poultry	processing 5	(6.2) 
 Mixed 11	(13.6) 
 None	known 8	(9.9) 
Clinical	use	of	oseltamivir‡  
 Used 65	(80.2) 
 Unknown 16	(19.8) 
Clinical	condition  
 Influenza-like	illness 11	(13.6) 
 Pneumonia 14	(17.3) 
 Mild	influenza 2	(2.5) 
 Severe	influenza 54	(66.7) 
Outcome  
 Death 22	(27.2) 
 Recovery 45	(55.6) 
 Hospitalization 14	(17.3) 
*M:F	sex	ratio	1.5:1. 
†Median patient age 52.0 y. 




(online Technical Appendix, http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/
article/20/12/14-0765-Techapp1.pdf). M genes of all vi-
ruses clustered with the genes detected in viruses from the 
main H7N9 virus cluster in 2013, whereas diversity was 
seen in the PA (main 2013 variant and 2 additional lineag-
es) and NP (2 lineages) genes. Combined, the H7N9 virus 
isolates that were sequenced appeared to represent at least 
4 different reassortants (Table 2).
HA and NA genes
The HA and NA genes of all H7N9 isolates from 
Guangdong Province we analyzed had high sequence 
identity (98.2%–99.7%) to viruses from other regions of 
China detected throughout 2013. However, the Guang-
dong Province isolates branched off and clustered with 




China,	 2013–2014.	 Shading	 indicates	
percentage	 of	 environmental	 swab	
specimens	 from	 live	 poultry	 markets	 in	
each	 region	 that	 were	 positive	 for	 each	
influenza	subtype	by	reverse	transcription	
PCR.	Circles	indicate	locations	of	human	






The outbreak of influenza A(H7N9) virus infection in 
humans in Guangdong Province that started in late 2013 
coincided with the emergence of influenza A H7 viruses 
in LPMs as determined by environmental surveillance. 
The strong association between detection of human H7N9 
cases and presence of H7 viruses in LPMs confirms that 
these market environments are sources of human exposure 
(8,13). A key question is how the virus has been spreading 
in China since the initial emergence in eastern China. A 
risk-mapping approach taking into account LPM locations, 
human population density, cropland irrigation, and meteo-
rologic conditions listed central Guangdong Province as a 
high-risk area (defined as probability of the presence of in-
fluenza A[H7N9] viruses) (14). Little is known, however, 
about how H7N9 virus spreads and the prevalence of infec-
tion in commercial poultry flocks. 
The data from our study suggest sources of human in-
fection in Guangdong Province are local. All sequenced vi-
ruses had evolved from the original strains through genetic 
reassortment with internal genes originating from influenza 
A(H9N2) viruses commonly found in southern China. The 
HA sequences of these viruses formed a distinct branch in 
phylogenetic trees, which indicates that reassortment oc-
curred some time ago and suggests that local sources of 








detected by surveillance activities. However, available data 
are insufficient to determine how long influenza A(H7N9) 
viruses have been circulating in this region.
The results from environmental surveillance suggest a 
higher prevalence of H9N2 virus in Guangdong Province 
poultry environments than in poultry environments in other 
regions of China (15). Because live poultry is the primary 
source of H7N9 virus (13,16–18), the coexistence with 
H9N2 in the same susceptible population generates ap-
propriate conditions for the emergence of novel reassortant 
variants such as those shown in this study. 
In summary, our findings indicate that multiple strains 
of H7N9 and H9N2 influenza viruses are circulating in 
poultry in Guangdong Province, creating an environment 
that is rich for reassortment of these viruses and that poses 
an ongoing risk for human infection. Continued and uncon-
trolled co-circulation of multiple avian and other influenza 
viruses that can infect humans pose a potential pandemic 
threat; increased animal surveillance and further study of 
the ecology of influenza viruses are essential.
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